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Abstract
Although substantive agreement exists on the role of climate variability and food scarcity in increasing violence, a
limited number of studies have investigated how food resources affect violent conflict. This article explores the
complex linkages between climate variability, agricultural production and conflict onset, by focusing on the spatial
distribution of crop production in a cross-country setting. We hypothesize that spatial differences in crop production
within countries are a relevant factor in shaping the impact of climate variability on conflict in agriculturally -
dependent countries. To test this hypothesis, we rely on high-resolution global gridded data on the local yield of four
main crops for the period 1982–2015 and aggregate the grid-cell information on crop production to compute an
empirical indicator of the spatial concentration of agricultural production within countries. Our results show that the
negative impacts of climate variability lead to an increase in the spatial concentration of agricultural production
within countries. In turn, the combined effect of climate extremes and crop production concentration increases the
predicted probability of conflict onset by up to 14% in agriculturally dependent countries.
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Introduction
Substantial agreement exists that climatic conditions can
impact security through intermediate pathways and/or
under some specific conditions (Mach et al., 2019). Yet,
the mechanisms connecting climate to conflict and the
conditions that make this link more likely to arise are rather
unclear (Koubi, 2019). Among the examined channels
through which climate variability can influence conflict,
agriculture and food security have received great attention
(Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014; Koren et al., 2021). This is
not surprising as conflict is arguably most widespread in
developing countries, which are not only heavily depen-
dent on agriculture (Lotze-Campen & Schellnhuber,
2009), but also disproportionately affected by changes in
climatic conditions (Porter et al., 2014). However, studies
of the climate–conflict nexus still lack explicit incorpora-
tion of agricultural variables in the models, which is essen-
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The main argument of this study follows three steps,
leading from climate extremes to conflict. First, the nega-
tive impacts of climate variability increase the spatial con-
centration of crop production across locations. Second, the
spatial distribution of crop production, which measures
how food access and livelihood conditions vary across
locations, is a relevant factor to shape the impact of
climate on conflict in agriculturally dependent coun-
tries. Third, the combined effect of climate extremes and
spatial concentration of crop production increases the
likelihood of conflict onset.
We test this argument by constructing a time-variant
Gini Index of crop production (GICP henceforth) within
countries. GICP provides a measure of the spatial distri-
bution of crops, that is, how concentrated or dispersed
crop production is across locations. Higher values of
GICP correspond to food output being concentrated in
few areas of the country, while lower levels of GICP indi-
cate that crop production is more homogeneously distrib-
uted. GICP enables us to examine how the spatial
distribution of agricultural resources shapes the effect of
climate on conflict over time. A set of validation tests
proves that GICP is a good measure of populations’ liveli-
hood and access to food.
To this end, the present analysis contributes to the
previous literature to several extents. First, the study
introduces a novel, time-varying measure of spatial
dispersion/concentration of crop production at the
country level. The use of GICP enables us to explicitly
examine the effect of climate extremes on the spatial
distribution of crop production within countries and
over time. Growing scientific evidence suggests that
the impact of climate variability on agricultural pro-
duction will vary considerably across space (Lobell,
Schlenker & Costa-Roberts, 2011), yet this relation-
ship has seldom been tested empirically. Second, our
analysis complements both country-level studies and
disaggregated analyses of the climate–conflict nexus,
by capturing a spatial dimension of vulnerability
related to crop production. Specifically, this article
thoroughly investigates the effect that geographical
patterns of crop production may exert on conflict;
these patterns have been generally overlooked by other
investigations, although implicitly assumed to occur.
Finally, our study makes use of new time-varying data
of agricultural production at the grid-cell level, along
with a wide set of climatic indicators which are expli-
citly relevant to agricultural production.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: the first
section elaborates our argument on climate variability,
crop production and conflict; the second section presents
the data and illustrates the construction and validation of
GICP; the final part discusses our empirical models and
presents the results.
Climate variability, crop production
concentration and conflict
The impacts of climate variability1 on agricultural pro-
duction are well established in the scientific literature.
Natural extremes and anomalies in weather conditions
that result from climate variability are already reducing
crop productions at the global level, a trend that is pro-
jected to continue as temperatures rise further (Lobell,
Schlenker & Costa-Roberts, 2011). If no adaptation
takes place, global yields are expected to decrease at a
pace of 1.5% per decade (Lobell & Gourdji, 2012) and
losses in aggregate production will affect wheat, rice and
maize in both temperate and tropical regions by 2C of
local warming (Challinor et al., 2014). Crop-level adap-
tation and technological innovation can moderate losses
to some extent (Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994) but adaptive
capacity is projected to be exceeded in regions closest to
the equator if temperatures increase by 3C or more
(Porter et al., 2014).
However, when one moves from a global to a local
(e.g. national or regional) focus, the impacts of climate
variability become more complex. While climate anoma-
lies are expected to have spatially heterogeneous impacts
on agriculture, yielding a net negative effect at the global
level (Lobell, Schlenker & Costa-Roberts, 2011), their
impacts at a local scale are less straightforward, and they
are expected to vary across both time and space (Kang,
Khan & Ma, 2009).
Not only the impacts of climate on food production
may vary across space (Iglesias et al., 2009, 2012), but
countries’ adaptive capacity to weather shocks is unlikely
to be spatially homogeneous and rather differs across
locations and strata of the populations within the same
country (Alam, 2017). One key aspect that can restrain a
country’s resilience to climate variability is represented
by the spatial distribution of food; the negative impacts
of climate variability are likely to increase relative
1 Climate change involves persistent shifts in the mean and variation
of surface weather conditions, such as temperature, precipitation and
wind, observed at a multidecadal scale or longer (WMO, 2017).
Climate variability refers to short-term or interannual changes in
surface weather conditions, which can lead to anomalies in climatic
statistics and the occurrence of extremes beyond those of individual
weather events. Although climate variability denotes a different
concept than climate change, it is an effect of long-term variations
in climate.
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differences in food access and supply at both the global
and local levels, as the degree of climate variation and the
extent of its impacts on populations will differ from one
community to another, and between rural and urban
areas (Wheeler & von Braun, 2013).
Adding to this complexity, a combination of contrasts
in the impacts of climate variability across regions (e.g.
weather extremes) along with a high concentration of
crop production in limited areas are also plausible. This
could increase the risk of spatial propagation of localized
crop failures (Alcamo et al., 2007), especially due to the
high food teleconnectivity between regions (Bren
D’Amour et al., 2016).
Overall, the vulnerability of a country to changes in
climatic conditions may not only be shaped by the quan-
tity of food production on average, but rather by how this
production is spatially distributed relative to the distri-
bution of population.2 Accounting for the spatial hetero-
geneity of food production is therefore paramount to
increase our understanding of countries’ vulnerability
to climate impacts. As decreases in one region may be
compensated by the increase in another region (Alcamo
et al., 2007), the national amount of food production
may not capture all the relevant dimensions of countries’
vulnerabilities.
Country-level empirical studies are thus unequipped
to represent spatial differences in the production of food,
as national statistics are too aggregated to reveal such
differences. Disaggregated studies may partially over-
come this measurement problem by examining the effect
of climate shocks locally (e.g. Harari & La Ferrara,
2018), but they cannot directly investigate the effect of
a change in the spatial distribution of crop production.
In fact, to calculate any measure of spatial dispersion, the
unit of analysis at which the main input is measured (e.g.
subnational) must be lower than the relevant unit at
which that distributional measure is calculated (e.g.
national). Although previous studies have investigated
the relationship between climate anomalies, food and
conflict (e.g. Koren & Bagozzi, 2016), a systematic
analysis of the spatial dynamics and distributional impli-
cations of food cannot be undertaken in traditional
empirical settings.
Due to these complexities, the previous literature has
not adequately accounted for the role of spatial variation
in resources’ distribution and further research needs to
target the geographical disaggregation of the impacts of
climatic conditions (Raleigh, Choi & Kniveton, 2015).
Guariso & Rogall’s (2017) study of the impacts of
inequality in rainfall across ethnic groups and McGuirk
& Burke’s (2017) analysis of climate impacts on conflicts
across food producing and non-food producing regions
provide good attempts in this direction, but they do not
specifically discuss how the spatial distribution of crops
may shape the impacts of climate on conflict.
As illustrated in what follows, we posit that the effect
of climate is especially detrimental in those countries that
are dependent on agriculture and where food production
is concentrated in few areas. Schematically, the line of
reasoning proposed in the article proceeds as follows:
climate anomalies (e.g. warm spells, droughts) have a
heterogeneous effect on crop production across loca-
tions, leading to a disproportionate harvest decrease in
some regions compared to others. Spatially heteroge-
neous crop failures will disproportionately restrain local
populations’ access to food, reduce rural households’
means of sustenance, induce peaks in food prices (Arezki
& Brueckner, 2014) which reduce consumers’ purchas-
ing power (Berazneva & Lee, 2013), and affect agricul-
tural income (Roche et al., 2020), all in all leading to a
heavier deterioration of the local livelihood in some
regions, while others are relatively better off. The relative
deprivation induced by a heterogeneous livelihood
impairment and shifts in food entitlements will in turn
(a) foster grievances, especially when intertwining with
extant societal fractures (Heslin, 2020) or ethnic exclu-
sion (Ide, Kristensen & Bartuseviĉius, 2021), (b) trigger
resource competition and deliberate efforts to deny
adversaries’ access to harvests (Linke & Ruether,
2021), and (c) decrease the opportunity cost of conflicts
for the poor and thereby motivate the use of collective
violence and increase the predisposition to armed con-
flict (Pinstrup-Andersen & Shimokawa, 2008).
We test this argument by constructing a Gini Index of
crop production (GICP), which provides a measure of
how the agricultural output is spatially distributed within
countries, and how access to food and livelihood condi-
tions may differ across regions. GICP enables us to cap-
ture a wide range of scenarios characterizing countries’
crop production in the aftermath of a climate extreme.
Before delving into the theoretical mechanisms in
detail, a caveat is necessary. The proposed steps connect-
ing climate and crop production to conflict are far from
deterministic; in particular, the association between the
spatial distribution of crops and conflict is conditioned
by agricultural dependence, to the extent that countries
which strongly rely on agriculture are more vulnerable to
climate shocks (Thomas & Twyman, 2005). We thereby
2 This specification may be relevant for sizeable countries with large
shares of arid land (e.g. deserts).
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expect our argument to be especially relevant for, and
our results to be driven by, agriculturally dependent
countries; we explore this condition explicitly in our
empirical analysis.
Even in stable climatic conditions, in those settings
where agricultural production is concentrated in few
regions, some households would be more vulnerable to
fluctuations in food supply and/or prices, as they would
have lower opportunities to access local food resources or
complement their diet with locally grown crops, and
limited income opportunities from agriculture. Conver-
sely, other households would be relatively better off and
more resilient to shocks. Regions with lower crop pro-
duction may be more vulnerable a priori to the harmful
effect of climate extremes, as they are characterized by
less fertile soils, poorer technological capacities and irri-
gation infrastructures, and in general by weather and
land conditions less suitable to agriculture. Climate
extremes may therefore disproportionately reduce crop
output in regions that were already disadvantaged and
lead to an increase in the territorial concentration of
agricultural production.
Schematically, we can think of three scenarios char-
acterizing the agricultural production of a country in the
aftermath of a climate extreme: harvests decrease in one
region while remaining stable in others; the country
experiences an average crop decline, but this decrease is
higher in one or few regions compared to others; finally,
crop production may even increase in regions less or not
severely hit by a drought, while yields decrease in affected
locations, thus leading to a sharper gap across space.
Climate-driven crop failures are expected to decrease
food supplies and put communities’ access to food at
stake (Lesk, Rowhani & Ramankutty, 2016), thus shift-
ing populations’ food entitlements (Berazneva & Lee,
2013) and directly affecting households’ livelihoods.
Climate shocks can not only affect food supply and
demand; they can also increase the variance of agricul-
tural incomes (Roche et al., 2020) and induce spikes in
food prices which destabilize the agricultural labor mar-
ket and reduce consumers’ purchasing power (Swinnen
& Squicciarini, 2012).
As a result, climate shocks to crop production will
affect livelihood conditions both directly, through
changes in the availability of and access to food, and
indirectly, through related changes in agricultural
income, food price fluctuations and changes in consu-
mers’ purchasing power. Heterogeneously distributed
crop failures due to climate shocks will hence lead to
unequal impairments in food entitlements and
livelihood conditions across locations and communities
(Wheeler & von Braun, 2013).
Adverse changes in food entitlement and livelihood
have a highly destabilizing potential (Berazneva & Lee,
2013), and conflicts tend to occur in areas experiencing
increased demand and lower supply of food resources
(Koren & Bagozzi, 2016). Sharpened differences in food
supply/demand and livelihood conditions can be even
more likely to increase the probability of conflict, by
fomenting feelings of relative deprivation, which will
encourage individuals to mobilize upon previous grie-
vances, and fuel competition for resources.
First, the disproportionate livelihood deterioration
induced by climate extremes will widen the gap between
what individuals perceive to be a fair condition and what
they acknowledge to be their actual status (Fjelde, 2015).
The relative deprivation felt by already poor farmers can
add to pre-existing inequalities and exacerbate societal
fragmentation (Jones, Mattiacci & Braumoeller, 2017),
and thereby encourage mobilization to obtain a fairer
distribution of resources. Relative differences in crop
production will possibly intertwine with pre-existing
grievances, as group leaders will have increased opportu-
nity to emphasize the group’s identity while disparaging,
discriminating against and besetting outsiders (Homer-
Dixon, 1991).
Next, groups with lower than average crop production
will be more willing to compete for resources against
resource-wealthier groups (De Juan, 2015). Resource
competition may result either directly or indirectly, via
an increase in migration flows. Negative shocks to agri-
cultural productivity caused by weather variation have
been shown to positively affect net migration outflows,
mainly from poor countries (Falco, Galeotti & Olper,
2019). In the aftermath of a climate-induced crop fail-
ure, rural labourers may resort to out-migration as an
adaptation strategy. Climate-induced migration can steer
resource competition in the receiving areas and foster
ethno-political tensions between migrants and host com-
munities, increasing the probability of conflict (Brzoska
& Fröhlich, 2015).
As an illustrative example, the civil conflict in Darfur
did not erupt in the northern or eastern regions, which
were the most hit by droughts, but in those which expe-
rienced an improvement in resource availability (Brown,
2010). The relative deterioration of resources in some
regions compared to the others triggered nomadic move-
ments of affected groups towards resource-abundant
regions, fostered reciprocal accusations of overexploiting
local resources, and reinforced pre-existing societal and
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ethnic cleavages, thus contributing to the conflict (De
Juan, 2015).
Finally, destitute individuals may become more will-
ing to fight for overthrowing the government and/or
getting increasing control over the productive capacity
(Robinson & Acemoglu, 2006). Also, the government
can deliberately manipulate households’ access to food to
undermine the insurgents, by distributing food relief and
aid only to supporting groups and excluding regions
which are known to host the insurgents – as happened
in both Darfur and Ethiopia (Keller, 1992; Hendrix &
Brinkman, 2013). As rebel groups generally propagan-
dize material incentives as a reward for engagement
(Kalyvas, 2006), individuals who were already worse off
due to the uneven distribution of agricultural output will
be particularly attracted to narratives of personal enrich-
ment put forward by rebel leaders. Especially in the lack
of viable economic alternatives, the opportunity cost of
joining the fight will be thus reduced.
All in all, exacerbated differences in crop production
will shape the spatial distribution of livelihood opportu-
nities, trigger resource competition (De Juan, 2015),
exacerbate previous grievances upon which individuals
are willing to act (Heslin, 2020), ease rebels’ effectiveness
in recruiting and, in turn, increase the probability of
violence.
What type of conflict is likely to be triggered by these
dynamics depends on who is identified as ‘liable’, that is,
who the affected individuals are likely to blame for their
conditions (Theisen, 2017). If individuals perceive the
government or the political elite as responsible for their
status, they will more likely seek to overthrow the cur-
rent political settings and the mobilization may thus
increase the risk of civil conflict. Exogenous shocks to
crop productions may especially destabilize political set-
tings if the government lacks the will or the capacity to
satisfy the most basic needs (e.g. Gleick, 2014) or if
citizens perceive food price increases as a government’s
failure to provide basic means of sustenance (Lagi, Ber-
trand & Bar-Yam, 2011). In the case where the members
of the government coincide with a specific ethnic group,
or when a particular ethnic group is perceived as the
‘culprit’ of the livelihood deterioration, however, the
mobilization is more likely to occur along ethnic borders
and thus ethnic conflict will be more likely. Deteriorated
livelihood conditions may also push individuals to rely
on the members of their group for sustenance, triggering
feelings of solidarity within the groups to the detriment
of others (De Juan & Hänze, 2021). Relative differences
in access to food may raise resentment in some groups
against those that are perceived to be better-off, thus
easing rebels’ effectiveness in mobilizing people, espe-
cially around a common identity (Homer-Dixon,
1991), which may increase the likelihood of non-state
and communal conflicts.
The line of reasoning articulated above leads us to
formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Climate variability increases the spatial
concentration of crop production within countries.
Hypothesis 2: High levels of concentration in crop
production are associated with a higher probability
of conflict onset.
Hypothesis 3: The impact of climate variability on
conflict onset is conditional on the spatial concentra-
tion of crop production.
Hypothesis 3a: The combined impact of climate varia-
bility and spatial distribution of crop production on
conflict is higher in agriculturally dependent
countries.
We test these hypotheses empirically by means of a
probit model, as illustrated in the following sections.
Data
The main dependent variable is Armed conflict onset,
defined broadly as a contested incompatibility where the
use of armed force between two parties results in at least
25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (UCDP,
2019). Onset is a binary variable coded as 1 for every
year in which a conflict breaks out in a given country and
0 otherwise. We explore different types of conflicts in
our empirical models. Civil conflict is defined as a state-
based conflict that involves at least a government of a
state as an active part (Pettersson, Högbladh & Öberg,
2019). Non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed
force between two organized armed groups, neither of
which is the government of a state, which results in at
least 25 battle-related deaths in a year (Sundberg, Eck &
Kreutz, 2012). Communal conflicts are defined as non-
state conflicts between two or more informally organized
groups, which identify themselves along identarian lines
(Pettersson, 2019).3 Data for these conflict types are
drawn from UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset. Finally,
Ethnic conflicts are violent episodes where rebels pursue
3 Communal conflicts correspond to non-state conflicts where the
organizational level is coded as 3 in the Non-State UCDP data
(Sundberg, Eck & Kreutz, 2012; Pettersson, Högbladh & Öberg,
2019).
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ethno-nationalist aims and recruit along ethnic lines in
order to achieve ethno-national self-determination, a
more favorable ethnic balance of power in government,
ethno-regional autonomy, the end of ethnic and racial
discrimination, or a more balanced division of resources
along ethnic lines within society. We utilize country-
level data on ethnic conflicts from the latest version of
the EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).
To build the GICP, we utilize annual production
(tonnes) of four main crops (maize, wheat, soybean, rice)
in a given grid cell. Global gridded data of annual crop
yields (tonnes/hectare) at 0.5-degree resolution
(* 55km55km at the equator), covering 1982–2015,
are drawn from a hybrid dataset (Iizumi et al, 2014, 2018;
Iizumi & Ramankutty, 2016; Iizumi & Sakai, 2020 –
details in Online appendix).4 Although the data include
only four major calorie crops, thereby partly limiting
our analysis, the trade-off permits us to assemble
consistent long panel data, necessary to investigate the
conditional effect of climate variability on conflict onset.5
As for climate data, we employ selective climatic indi-
cators considered most relevant for agriculture. Isolating
the climate component which effectively impacts local
agriculture is fundamental to disentangle the effect of
climate variability on conflict (Harari & La Ferrara,
2018). Our main vector of climate variables (Table II)
includes standardized annual anomalies of growing
degree-days (GDD) and precipitation anomalies from
their long-term mean (P). GDD (McMaster & Wilhelm,
1997) are heat-units measuring the cumulative amount
of time a crop is exposed to temperatures favorable for
phenological growth. Compared to other thermal mea-
sures such as average growing season temperatures, GDD
better captures non-linearities in the relationship between
temperature and agricultural productivity (Roberts,
Schlenker & Eyer, 2012). Other agroclimatic indicators
such as the Warm Spell Duration Index (WSDI), self-
calibrating Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) and
Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index
(SPEI) were also examined as alternative measures of cli-
mate variability for our study period (details in Online
appendix). In line with common practice in climate–con-
flict literature (Buhaug, 2015), meteorological variables
from both observations (Harris, 2014) and reanalysis data
products (Rodell et al., 2004; Mistry, 2019), as well as
different functional forms of climatic indicators (standar-
dized anomalies, coefficient of variation, empirical prob-
ability) were utilized as sensitivity checks (details in
Online appendix). The climatic indicators and the various
operationalizations used in our study not only capture
variations in climate extremes due to both natural and
anthropogenic causes, but are also documented to be exa-
cerbated by global warming (Seneviratne et al., 2012).
As a number of factors can influence conflict, we include
a battery of explanatory and control variables in our empiri-
cal models. First, regions can be naturally endowed with
fertile soils and climate suitable to agriculture, making
them more resilient to climate variability impacts. Hence,
we control for the share of agricultural land over the total
country area. In those regions whose climatic conditions
are less suitable for agriculture, irrigation can compensate
for water scarcity and environmental shocks, increasing
populations’ resilience to climate extremes (Mendelsohn
& Seo, 2007). Share of irrigation is also a suitable measure
of technological development in agriculture (e.g. Dinar &
Zilberman, 1991). Suitability for agriculture and irrigation
technologies may thus increase countries’ resilience to cli-
mate variability impacts; therefore, we control for the
amount of irrigated land as a proportion of total cultivated
land (extensive description of the variable and data sources
can be found in the Online appendix, Table A.I). As rural
populations and regions with a high dependence on agri-
culture may be more vulnerable to climate variability
impacts (von Uexkull, 2014), we include controls for the
proportion of the rural population and agricultural added
value as a share of GDP. In the next sections, we also
explicitly test the validity of our argument for agriculturally
dependent countries.
Further, governmental policies can have great influence
in agricultural distribution, not only through the alloca-
tion of property rights (Butler & Gates, 2012) but also by
shaping micro-level decisions in agricultural production,
for example by providing incentives and subsidies to farm-
ers, or implementing insurance schemes to protect farmers
against climate shocks (Dinar & Mendelsohn, 2011). The
state can direct relief programs to help some groups cope
with the negative impacts of climate variability, while
purposefully excluding others (Theisen, Holtermann &
Buhaug, 2012). Next, countries’ trade policies and storage
strategies can be directed to compensate for crop failures
and stabilize food prices (Schewe, Otto & Frieler, 2017).
To account for these factors, our models include controls
for regime type, sociopolitical discrimination and trade
volume in food. The following sections detail the steps
of our main argument, leading from climate anomalies to
higher conflict risk.
4 The 0.50.5 spatial resolution is the most commonly used unit
of analysis in social science and conflict research, as it corresponds
with the average precision of conflict data.
5 A discussion of the implications of this choice can be found in the
Online appendix.
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Climate variability and spatial concentration
of crop production
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
compute a time-varying indicator of the spatial distribu-
tion of agricultural production and explore how it corre-
lates to conflict. Some studies did focus on land
distribution as a potential predictor of insurgency, but
they only concentrated on the maldistribution of land
tenure (e.g. Boix, 2003; Hidalgo et al., 2010), while
neglecting differences in land productivity and agricul-
tural production. Land maldistribution is not necessarily
a good proxy of crop production; indeed, higher agricul-
tural outputs can be achieved without necessarily
expanding the amount of land per capita, through
enhanced agronomic practices, improved crop varieties
and other technological innovations (Tilman et al.,
2011).
We compute GICP as a measure of spatial distribu-
tion of crop production at the country level, and as a
sensitivity test, across ethnic groups (the ‘between-
groups’ GICP is discussed in the Online appendix).
GICP for a country’s area consisting of n grid-cells with


















where gridded crop production values yi are indexed in
non-decreasing order such that yi  yiþ1.6 A GICP value
of 0 corresponds to a perfectly homogeneous distribution
of crop growth within the country, while a GICP of 1
indicates that the crop production is concentrated in one
or few producing areas.
We construct two basic measures of GICP: the first
uses information on crop production from all grid-cells;
the second is limited to rural grid-cells and excludes
urban areas from the sample. We also compute the same
measures weighted by population size (details in Online
appendix).7 Urban areas will have low or null production
of crops and could erroneously be interpreted as ‘poor’ in
agricultural value compared to rural locations. As our
main goal is to observe the effect of the distribution of
crop across space, including urban areas in the analysis
may potentially influence the construction of GICP, as it
would consider urban cells equal to rural locations which
have a low or null level of crop production. Consistently,
we perform our empirical analysis by using both mea-
sures – the GICP computed for the entire sample, as well
as for the subset of the sample that only includes rural
areas.
Figure 1 visualizes the values of GICP for both the full
sample and only rural cells.8 The distribution of crop
production is not considerably affected by the exclusion
of urban areas from the sample, as the values of the GICP
tend to follow the same pattern whether urban areas are
included or not. High values of spatial concentration of
crop production are evenly distributed across the world.
The high value of GICP in developed countries, as in
the United States, is coherent with the technological
advances in cultivation techniques and the shift to inten-
sive farming that characterize the latest stages of eco-
nomic development, leading to an oligopolistic
concentration of crop production in the hands of few
producers (Sexton et al., 2007).
Although climate variability may have disruptive
effects for farmers in the USA, due to the concentration
of crop production in relatively few areas, the effect of
the shock will still be limited in the overall socio-
economic system, where only 11% of the population is
employed in the agricultural sector, and food accounts
for less than 13% of households’ expenditures (USDA,
2020).
However, the same value of GICP may arguably have
a more detrimental effect in Mali, where almost 80% of
people are employed in agriculture (FAO, 2017) and
highly vulnerable to climate extremes (von Uexkull,
2014). This points to our framework condition relative
to the importance of agricultural dependence for our
argument (Hypothesis 3a). We explicitly test for this
condition in our empirical models, by observing how the
effect of climate variability and crop concentration varies
across countries with high and low dependence on
agriculture.
Validation of the Gini Index of agricultural production
Before testing the link between climate variability, agri-
cultural production and conflict empirically, we first
6 Data on crop production are drawn from grid-cell-level data on four
main crops (Iizumi & Sakai, 2020), as described in the previous
section.
7 Rural cells are defined as those whose land surface is not covered by
any urban structure, according to GlobCover categorization
(Bontemps, Defourny & Van Bogaert, 2009). Urban cells are any
cells for which the extension of the urban area is greater than zero.
8 The map for between-group GICP is reported in Online appendix,
Figure A.7.
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verify whether GICP is indeed a good measure of popu-
lations’ livelihood and access to food.
We verify the validity of this measure through two
tests: first, by observing the correlation of GICP with the
spatial differences in economic activities; second, by
exploring how climate variability affects the sustain-
ability of national food systems. The first test is
meant to validate the ability of GICP to capture dif-
ferences in populations’ livelihoods across the coun-
try; the second aims at validating our claim that the
spatial distribution of crop production is relevant to
individuals’ access to food and may be impacted by
climate extremes.
Spatial differences in crop production and livelihood
Agricultural production may represent an important
source of income in several societies and a key factor in
populations’ livelihood. If this assumption holds, differ-
ences in the spatial distribution of crops should be
reflected by similar patterns in the spatial distribution
of countries’ GDP. Given the complexity of economic
and social systems, this is not expected to be a one-to-one
relationship, as otherwise the concentration of income
may be used as a perfect substitute for crop production
concentration.
In order to explore the potential relationship between
crop and income spatial concentration, we estimate a
simple model that regresses the country-year Gini coeffi-
cient of GDP on the Gini Index of agricultural produc-
tion (details in Online appendix). Both Gini coefficients
are calculated for the same grid-cells to guarantee the
highest possible level of comparability.
Table A.IV and Figure A.6 in the Online appendix
report the conditional correlation coefficients between
crop production spatial concentration and the extent of
inequality in the distribution of gross domestic products.
The coefficients suggest that spatial inequality in income
distribution reflects the patterns of the spatial concentra-
tion of crops. This relationship is accentuated among
countries where agriculture constitutes a significant share
of national employment. We observe that a one standard
deviation (1) increase in crop concentration is followed
by an increase in (standardized) income inequality index
of 0.5 points (which corresponds to a 0.1 point increase
in the non-standardized measure). The above evidence
indicates that GICP may be a relevant measure of
Figure 1. Gini Index of crop production computed at the country level, for grid-cells nested within countries: (a) all cells; (b)
rural cells only
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differences in populations’ livelihoods across space and it
is especially germane to agriculturally dependent coun-
tries, where large shares of populations are employed in
agriculture.
Climate variability, spatial differences in crop production
and food
One key assumption of our analysis concerns the effect
of climate variability on the spatial concentration of agri-
cultural production across locations. As the negative
impacts of climate variability are expected to affect com-
munities’ ability to satisfy their basic needs and their
choices concerning food consumption, we should also
observe a relationship between the climatic indicators
and the sustainability of food systems.
To this end, we validate the GICP by regressing a
cross-country indicator of food sustainability (Béné
et al., 2019) on the vector of agroclimatic indicators.
The food sustainability indicator (FSE) provides a syn-
thetic but comprehensive representation of national food
systems, encompassing measures of food security along
with socio-economic dimensions. Regressing FSE
against climate variability enables us to test how climate
influences the sustainability and security of food systems
across countries. Table A.V in the Online appendix pre-
sents the results. We find that a 1 increase in GDD
variation increases the sustainability of food systems
approximately by 0.02, while a 1 increase in precipita-
tion variability leads to a similar decrease in food sustain-
ability. The robust, although small, association between
climate variability and the sustainability of food systems
underscores our first hypothesis on the effect of climate
on crop distribution and increases our confidence in the
ability of GICP to measure populations’ access to food.
We also find that this association is stronger in agri-
culturally dependent regions, strengthening the rele-
vance of agricultural dependence as a framework
condition for our argument.
Climate variability and spatial concentration of crop
production
The main argument of this study follows three steps,
leading from negative impacts of climate variability to
conflict. It is important to note that our empirical mod-
els cannot be interpreted in terms of an indirect causal
link between climate extremes and conflict, but they
provide insight on how climate may impact the spatial
distribution of food resources, and how this in turn may
increase the likelihood of violence.
In order to test our hypotheses we proceed as follows:
(i) as climate variability may alter the distribution of
crops across locations, we first estimate a set of empirical
models in which crop production concentration, mea-
sured by GICP, is regressed on the climate variability
indicators (details in Online appendix); (ii) we estimate
the effect of crop spatial concentration and climate on
the probability of conflict outbreak; (iii) we quantify the
joint effect of climate and crop spatial concentration on
conflict onset.
As for (iii) we estimate the following empirical model:
Yi;t ¼ a0 þ a1GICPi;t1 þ a2Ai;t1
þ a3½GICPi;t1  Ai;t1 þ a4Xi;t þ a5Ci;t þ i;t
ð2Þ
where GICPi;t1 is the standardized GICP in country i
in year t  1; A is the vector of standardized agroclimatic
anomalies (lagged precipitation and lagged GDD), X
contains a set of country-specific variables, and C is the
vector of spatial (continent-level) and time controls. This
empirical strategy enables us to account for the dynamic
aspect of crop concentration and time-varying climate
anomalies, as well as their joint effect on conflict, both
within countries over time and across countries. As our
goal is to observe the impacts of climate variability on
crop production, temporal within-country variation is
especially important – relative to cross-sectoral variation.
Within-country GICP considerably varies over time,
especially from year to year (Figure A.5 in Online appen-
dix). This time-varying, cross-country framework allows
us to properly take into account differences in countries’
vulnerability to climate extremes, which may be due to
their differing agroclimatic conditions, the suitability of
their land for agriculture, and varying degrees of irriga-
tion development and technological endowments. Need-
less to say, other factors can affect countries’ adaptive
capacity to climate extremes as well as their latent risk
of conflict, and we appropriately include controls for
these elements (illustrated in section 3).
Finally, to test the hypothesis that societies character-
ized by higher levels of concentration in crop production
may be more vulnerable to climatic shocks, we interact
GICP with standardized anomalies of precipitation and
GDD. As a dependent variable Y we consider the onset
of four different types of conflicts, namely civil, ethnic,
non-state and communal conflicts.
In our main model specifications, we lagged GICP
and climate variables by one year, consistently with the
wider literature on the climatic–agricultural impacts in a
panel data setting (e.g. Deschênes & Greenstone, 2012).
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Persistence in soil conditions, especially in rain-fed cul-
tivation regimes with a prolonged drought-like condi-
tion, can result in a lagged effect on crop productivity
(Hatfield et al., 2011). Moreover, climatic conditions
prior to the crop planting window (e.g. warm spell) are
also known to have detrimental effects on the eventual
seasonal harvest.
Results
The results from Table I show that a 1 increase in
precipitation variation is associated with a 0.07 point
increase in GICP, while the effect of a 1 increase in
GDD variation is somewhat lower (0.04). The same
regressions have been performed for GICP calculated
at the ethnic group level, as well as for alternative climate
indicators (Table A.XV).
The results from Table I substantiate Hypothesis 1,
confirming that the negative impacts of climate variabil-
ity alter the spatial distribution of crop production and
lead to an increase in the spatial concentration of crops.
Table II reports the results of Equation 2 for the full
set of countries over the period 1982–2015. Crop pro-
duction concentration correlates positively with civil and
ethnic conflict onset, suggesting that a 1 increase in
GICP raises the probability of civil (ethnic) conflict out-
break by 2.1% (1%). As for communal conflicts, the
effect is mostly driven by rural areas: the coefficient of
GICP calculated over rural cells (Model 8) is higher than
the one referring to GICP calculated over all cells
(Model 4).
The coefficients of agroclimatic indicators (Table
A.VII in the Online appendix) indicate that climate
seems not to have a strong independent effect on the
likelihood of conflict onset, except for ethnic conflicts
where this association is negative. The lack of a strong
correlation between climate variability and conflict may
be due to the impact of climate being mediated by agri-
cultural concentration. As climate variability has a posi-
tive effect on GICP (Table I), crop concentration may
partially absorb the effect of climate on conflict and thus
explain why we do not find a strong effect in the first set
of models. We test this intuition by interacting the cli-
matic variables with GICP. The results of these models,
including interactions between climate variables and
GICP, are presented in Figure 2.
The findings suggest that spatial differences in crop
production may act as a bridge between climate extremes
and conflict, but the effect is statistically significant only
Table I. OLS Model: GICP crop (country level/non-standardized) regressed on climate (Models 1–3 all cells – GICP_all;
Models 4–6 rural cells – GICP_r)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable GICP_all GICP_all GICP_all GICP_r GICP_r GICP_r
GDD (spatial) 0.044** 0.024y 0.045** 0.026*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
PREC (spatial) 0.074** 0.067** 0.072** 0.064**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP 0.075* 0.047y 0.048y 0.061* 0.032 0.035
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
Population 0.022y 0.014 0.010 0.023* 0.015 0.011
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Rural pop. –0.000 –0.001 –0.001 –0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agr. AV 0.038 0.016 0.017 0.014 –0.012 –0.009
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Trade (food) 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.013y 0.015** 0.015*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Irrig. land –0.110 –0.159y –0.155y –0.172 –0.223y –0.218y
(0.097) (0.090) (0.091) (0.106) (0.117) (0.117)
N. Observations 3,606 3,606 3,606 3,225 3,225 3,225
R2 0.443 0.506 0.516 0.407 0.467 0.480
Continent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: y p < 0:1, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01. Precipitation and GDD are here defined as coefficients of variation (details in Online
appendix).
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for non-state and communal conflicts. Locations that
suffer from a 1 decrease in precipitation, combined
with a 1 increase in agricultural concentration, have
nearly a 6% higher probability of experiencing non-
state conflict outbreak and a 5% higher probability of
communal conflict onset (Figure 2). Likewise, when
introducing the interaction terms, the stand-alone GICP
remains roughly the same for all types of conflict onsets
but gains significance for communal conflicts (Models 4,
8). Similar results are found when we replicate the model
for the between-group GICP (Tables A.IX–X, Online
appendix) and the population-weighted GICP (Table
A.XI, Online appendix).
Results of these models indicate that the combined
effect of climate variability and crop production pro-
vides incentives to mobilization between rebel groups,
especially along identarian lines. This is consistent
with previous studies advancing that changes in local
livelihood and food access may not be the primary
motivation to join rebel groups, but rather contribute
Table II. Probit model: conflict onset regressed on climate variables, GICP (country level; all cells and rural cells) and the
interaction between GICP and climate variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Civil Ethnic NS Comm. Civil Ethnic NS Comm.
GICP 0.021** 0.012** 0.009 0.014*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
GICP_r 0.020** 0.011* 0.011 0.017*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
GDD –0.001 –0.003 –0.003 0.004 –0.003 –0.004 –0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
PREC –0.002 –0.006* –0.006y –0.008y –0.002 –0.006* –0.006y –0.008y
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
GDD*GICP 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
PREC*GICP 0.002 0.004y 0.008** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GDD*GICP_r 0.004 0.007y 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
PREC*GICP_r 0.001 0.004 0.010** 0.010*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP –0.018 –0.017* –0.000 0.025* –0.019 –0.018y –0.000 0.029*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.021) (0.014)
Population 0.015** 0.007* 0.037** 0.025** 0.017* 0.007* 0.041** 0.027**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006)
Anocracy 0.025* 0.006 0.027* 0.019** 0.026* 0.007 0.029* 0.021**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
Discrim. 0.054y 0.019 0.086** 0.033 0.057y 0.019 0.093** 0.034
(0.029) (0.015) (0.032) (0.022) (0.032) (0.017) (0.035) (0.024)
Rural pop. 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.001 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Agr. AV 0.004 –0.003 0.041* 0.037** 0.002 –0.005 0.045* 0.042**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.018) (0.012)
Trade (food) 0.004 0.004 –0.003 –0.000 0.005 0.004 –0.003 0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Irrig. land 0.035 0.008 –0.004 –0.036 0.034 0.014 –0.006 –0.035
(0.028) (0.023) (0.043) (0.026) (0.038) (0.027) (0.059) (0.034)
N. Obs. 3,571 3,571 3,571 3,571 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.154 0.3070 0.382 0.113 0.144 0.289 0.370
Continent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: y p < 0:1, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01. Precipitation and GDD are here defined as standardized annual anomalies from their
long-term means (details in Online appendix).
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to mobilizing protests around pre-existing grievances
(Heslin, 2020).
However, the lack of a robust effect of climate and
agricultural concentration on civil conflicts may also be
due to contextual factors. The impact of climate varia-
bility may be conditional to agricultural dependence,
whereby populations relying on agriculture as their pri-
mary source of income are disproportionately vulnerable
to environmental hardships. The next section discusses
this framework condition further.
Dependence on agriculture
The results of our validation tests (Tables A.IV and A.V
in Online appendix) point to crop production as an
important mean of sustenance, especially among coun-
tries which are highly dependent on agriculture. Hence,
we expect the joint effect of climate extremes and GICP
to be mainly relevant for societies that heavily rely on
agriculture.
Tables A.XIII–A.XIV in the Online appendix repli-
cate the models in Table II for two subsets of countries
defined in terms of their dependence on agriculture,
proxied by high or low share of agricultural employment
in the national workforce. Crop production concentra-
tion and climate anomalies are found to be particularly
important for agriculturally dependent societies, while
their effect is null or very weak among the countries with
low agricultural dependence.
In countries that strongly rely on agriculture, the
combined effect of a 1 decrease in GDD and a 1
increase in GICP leads to an increase in the probability
of civil conflict of 14% and of non-state conflict by
around 10% (Figures A.8 and A.9, Online appendix).
This substantiates our framework condition relative to
the importance of agricultural dependence in shaping the
effect of climate variability and crop production concen-
tration on conflict onset and shows that the results for
the full sample are mainly driven by the set of agricultu-
rally dependent countries.
The Online appendix reports the results of multiple
sensitivity tests. First, we replicate the models presented
in Table II with alternative climate specifications and by
including several different controls; the results do not
change substantially. Second, we test the empirical valid-
ity of the GICP by replicating the models in Table II
with the absolute value of crop production as the main
independent variable (Table A.XVII). The coefficients
suggest that crop production alone does not correlate
significantly with conflict outbreak (Models 1–4, Table
A.XVII in the Online appendix). Moreover, even when
controlling for the absolute quantity of crop production
(Models 5–8), the magnitude and statistical significance
of GICP are similar to those presented in Table II, thus
substantiating our confidence in the importance of the
spatial distribution of crops, rather than the absolute
quantity, in explaining conflict.
We further explore the robustness of GICP by look-
ing at the contribution it brings in improving predictive
performance in an out-of-sample setting. Such a test
would allay concerns of both model overfitting on the
sample data and reducing the risk of errors originating
from statistical distributional assumptions inherent with
in-sample analytics, such as over-reliance on p-values
(Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010). Results of these tests
confirm the importance of GICP as a predictor of
Figure 2. Combined marginal effect of climate variability (precipitation anomaly) and spatial concentration of crop production
on non-state and communal conflict onset
The effects are significant at the 1% level for non-state and 5% level for communal conflicts
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conflict onset, strengthen its empirical validity, and high-
light the importance of agricultural dependence as a con-
textual factor (details in Online appendix).
Conclusions
This study investigates whether the spatial distribution
of crop production shapes societies’ capacity to deal with
climate extremes and makes them more vulnerable to
violence in turn. A key finding of the study is that cli-
mate variability increases the spatial concentration of
crop production, exacerbating the relative differences
in crop output across locations. Increased spatial differ-
ences in crop production shape populations’ livelihood
opportunities and ease rebels’ effectiveness in mobilizing
individuals, especially along identarian lines. We find
that higher concentrations of crop production increase
the likelihood of conflict onset and condition the effect
of climate variability on violence. This effect is greater in
countries that rely heavily on agriculture.
One main caveat of the present analysis is that the
suggested linkage from climate variability to conflict is far
from deterministic and strongly depends on contextual
factors, mostly agricultural dependence. Differences in
food access across locations can likely aid in mobilizing
protests around pre-existing grievances, some unrelated to
food access, rather than developing new grievances.
In this perspective, the analysis can be extended to test
how socio-economic and institutional characteristics
may influence the relationship between climate, the spa-
tial distribution of crops and conflict onset. More effi-
cient institutional systems, able to guarantee a fair
distribution of property rights and enforce cooperative
agreements to manage resources, can mediate the nega-
tive consequences of climatic changes and attenuate
tensions.
Finally, a limitation of the present study is represented
by data availability; indeed, grid-cell-level information
on crop production, utilized to compute the agricultural
distribution at the country level, does not correspond to
the agricultural output available to each household. To
this end, the study of spatial distribution in crop pro-
duction will surely benefit from ongoing progress in data
collection, which will hopefully make available high-
quality time-variant survey data on agricultural
production.
Replication data
The dataset and scripts for the empirical analysis in this
article, along with the Online appendix, can be found at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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